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Perceptual Representations as Basic Reasons
1
 
 
One of the things epistemologists are especially interested in is the question what the structure 
of human justification is like. The classic alternatives are, of course, foundationalism and 
coherentism. There are different methodological approaches to answer this question. On the 
one hand, one might begin with analyzing the conditions of justification according to our 
ordinary understanding. As soon as they are established it is easy to find out what the 
structure of reasons must look like in order to satisfy these conditions. Here is the answer of 
classic foundationalism: The inferential justification has to terminate in cognitive states that 
are intrinsically justified. This requirement can only be satisfied either by experiences with a 
subjective content or by beliefs about one’s own experiences. Classic coherentists disagree. 
According to them, justification has to move in a big circle where every justifier is justified by 
other cognitive states. So far, I don’t want to opt for or against one of these alternatives. The 
important thing to notice is that both argue completely in the abstract, i. e., merely on the 
basis of normative considerations. For this reason I will call their approach “purely 
normative.” 
 On the other hand, there is a purely descriptive approach to epistemology.
2
 It begins 
with a description of the structure of our justification as it in fact is. Quine was completely 
content with this first step and did not even raise normative questions.
3
 However, there are 
others who try to establish normative conclusions on the same basis. They simply presuppose 
that the structure of our justification as it is corresponds or approximates to the structure of 
justification as it should be.
4
  
 There is no doubt that the normative approach has – at least until recently –  been 
dominant within epistemology. Still there always have been some, mostly common-sense 
philosophers like Reid, Moore, Wittgenstein, Goodman and Chisholm who were interested in 
the descriptive approach. In my opinion both approaches, the normative as well as the 
descriptive, have severe shortcomings. The descriptive approach strikes me as dogmatic. 
Moreover, it cannot explain why the actual structure of our justification is supposed to be 
correct. The normative approach faces problems of a different kind. It soon turns out that the 
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structure of justification as it should be has nothing or, at least, very little to do with the 
structure of human justification as it really is – no matter whether we accept foundationalism 
or coherentism. In both cases the normative approach creates unrealistically high standards for 
justification. 
 This can be shown very easily. Classic foundationalism for example requires for any 
beliefs to be justified that there are intrinsically justified basic reasons supporting them. This 
requirement can only be satisfied, if it can be satisfied at all, either by experiences of 
subjective appearances (e. g. sense data) or by beliefs about one’s own experiences. These are 
the only cognitive states that have at least a small chance of being intrinsically justified by 
virtue of there alleged infallibility. However, our beliefs about the external world are in fact 
neither based on experiences with a subjective content nor are they based on beliefs about our 
own experiences. The first claim is supported by contemporary theories of perception. Most 
of them take sense experience as intentionally directed at the objective world around us.
5
 With 
respect to the second claim I certainly admit that we are able to produce (introspective) beliefs 
about our own experiences. But these beliefs do not play any role in the actual generation of 
perceptual beliefs about the world.
6
 In the case of coherentism things look quite similar. We 
are not perfectly rational beings and, therefore, the coherence requirement will be hardly ever 
satisfied. 
 For proponents of the normative approach there are different options to react. First of 
all, they may try to minimize the gap between norms and facts. It is often claimed that norms 
are idealizations which can be satisfied only approximately.
7
 There is also the idea of 
accommodating the facts to the norms. For example you can insist on the subjective analysis 
of empirical content at any cost. Often the proponents of the normative approach also 
postulate tacit beliefs about one’s own experiences.8 Yet none of these strategies will be 
strikingly successful. For these auxiliary assumptions are mostly implausible, and even if they 
were true, they could at most diminish the gap but never close it completely. In the end 
proponents of the normative approach cannot avoid admitting that we never or almost never 
satisfy the norms of justification. This is tantamount to saying that skepticism turns out to be 
true. 
 Since the descriptive approach, on the one hand, does not give the least explanation of 
why the actual structure of human justification is correct and since the normative approach, on 
the other hand, leads directly towards skepticism, we should better look out for a third way. 
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My suggestion is the following: We should start by describing the actual structure of our 
justification. After that we should deal with the question of how it is possible for this structure 
to be the correct structure of justification. In other words: What are the conditions of the 
possibility to understand our structure of justification as the correct one? 
 In what follows I will apply this method to the structure of empirical justification. In 
the first part I will show that, from a purely descriptive point of view, our beliefs about the 
external world are based on perceptual representations of this world. These representations are 
in fact our basic reasons. In the second part I will argue that it seems impossible to understand 
why perceptual representations should be basic reasons of our beliefs about the world, if we 
take a normative stance. As it turns out, similar problems result from the perspectives of 
epistemic internalism and externalism. In the third part I will present a solution to this 
dilemma. Finally, I will outline some of the consequences of my solution. 
 
I 
 
The actual structure of justification of our beliefs about the external world appears to be 
foundationalist. Our theoretical beliefs are based on our beliefs about the observational world 
by means of inductive or explanatory inferences. Beliefs about the observational world are 
based on our sense experience. At the level of sense experiences, however, our demand for 
further reasons runs dry. So it looks as if sense experiences are really our basic reasons for our 
alleged knowledge about the external world. This structure of justification is also mirrored in 
our practice of giving reasons. If you were to ask a competent scientist why he is committed 
to a certain scientific theory, he probably would mention experimental evidence that can be 
better accounted for by his theory than by any other alternative being around. Now if you 
went on asking him, why he believes that the relevant data are correct, he would refer at least 
in some cases to his own readings of scientific instruments. He would assert that he himself 
has seen the instruments indicating what is written down in the protocol of the relevant 
experiments. Suppose you still went on asking him for further reason. You might ask him for 
what reason he did see what he saw. In that case he certainly would shake his head and 
mumble that this question makes no sense. Sense experiences are not among those things for 
which one needs or even can give reasons. One simply has them or one doesn’t have them. 
 This primary sketch of the actual justificational structure of our beliefs about the 
external world needs some fine-tuning. If one reads the real structure of justification out off 
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our practice of giving reasons, one might be tempted to think that our chains of inferential 
justification do not terminate in experience itself but in linguistically articulated sentences 
about sense experience. For any articulation of a reason is bound to linguistic means. 
However, this is a fallacy.
9
 I do not deny that any articulation of a reason is linguistic. But 
from this it does not follow that the thing which is articulated, namely the reason, has a 
linguistic nature. Especially in the case of perceptual reasons we are describing reasons by 
means of our language which themselves are non-linguistic entities. 
 What is the true nature of those sense experiences which serve us as basic reasons? 
Recent theories of perception suggest the following ontology. First, sense experience has 
intentional content directed at objective facts in the external world. Second, sense experience 
is not a kind of belief or judgement. Third, the intentional (or representational) content of 
sense experience is non-conceptual. Let me briefly rehearse the main arguments for this 
account of sense experience. I begin with the issue of intentionality.
10
 For a long time 
empiricism has been captured by the idea that the immediate content of experience is 
something like a subjective appearance. One main reason for this view has been the argument 
from deception of the senses (often called “argument from illusion” or “argument from 
hallucination”). From an ordinary point of view sensory illusions or hallucinations seem to 
have the same content as veridical sense experiences. At least introspectively we cannot 
distinguish between veridical and deceptive cases. But obviously in the case of hallucination 
there is no corresponding object in the external world. Therefore, the argument concludes, the 
experiential content can never be objective, i. e. be directed at facts in the external world. It 
now seems to be a common place that this argument is not valid. Even if we admit that the 
content of deceptive and veridical experiences is the same and in the case of hallucinations 
there is no corresponding object, it does not follow that the content of sense experience is not 
objective. The content may be objective, even if a corresponding object does not exist. We 
just have to understand the content as intentional instead of relational. Sense experiences can 
be directed at correctness conditions in the external world, even if these conditions are not 
satisfied. For this reason the argument from deception cannot be accepted as a good argument 
against the objectivity of experiential content. There are, however, also arguments for the 
objectivity of experiential content. I here just want to mention the so called ‘transparency 
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intuition.’11 The core of it can be put in the following nutshell. If we describe the content of 
our introspectively accessible sense experiences, we realize that in those descriptions we 
exclusively use sentences which normally are used to describe facts in the external world. We 
use this objective vocabulary no matter whether the sense experience being described is 
veridical or deceptive. The best explanation of this fact is that experiential content is both, 
intentional and objective. 
 Since this is also one of the characteristics of belief content, one is easily tempted to 
understand sense experience as a special kind of belief or judgement.
12
 However, there are 
two strong objections against this view. First, sense experiences (as, e. g., the Müller-Lyer 
illusion) are resistent against contradictory beliefs.
13
 Even in case we learn that both lines in 
the figure are equally long, they still continue to appear as having different lenght. This could 
hardly be the case, if experience were a kind of belief. Second, we are able to rember details 
of a perceptual scenario which we never thought about.
14
 Take the following example as an 
illustration of this point. You may see a small crowd of people without having any thoughts or 
beliefs about the exact number of  people you observe. If anybody asked you for the number, 
you could not avoid counting the people before answering his question. This proves that you 
actually have no belief about the number of people. Now it may be that after your visual 
experience has vanished for some time you are going to ask yourself how many people you 
really did see. In order to answer this question you cannot rely on any of your beliefs. For you 
do not have beliefs about the number of people. But you can do something else. You can 
recall your former experience. With the help of remembering this experience you can find out 
the number. This shows that sense experience contains a representation of the number of 
people in the crowd, although no corresponding belief is available. 
 Moreover, the intentional content of sense experience is non-conceptual, since the 
content of experience is more fine-grained as any of our available concepts.
15
 This is 
especially true with respect to our ability of distinguishing different shades of color. 
Experiential content is also not as selective as conceptual content is. We may, for example, 
have the concept of a colored object without thinking of any determinate color. The case of 
sense experience is completely different. We cannot have the experience of a colored object 
without experiencing the object as having a determinate color. Both observations support the 
claim that sense experiential content is non-conceptual. 
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 This description of the actual structure of our beliefs’ justification supports a 
foundationalist account. Non-doxastic perceptual representations of the external world serve 
as basic reasons for our beliefs about this world. But this kind of foundationalism differs 
significantly from old-fashioned versions of foundationalism. Firstly, the intentionality of 
sense experience makes deception possible. So sense experiences are both, fallible as well as 
defeasible reasons. They are called “basic reasons” only in so far as they do not require any 
further reasoning. Secondly, the fact that the content of sense experience is objective makes 
sure that the problem of our beliefs’ being underdetermined by evidence dissolves. If 
experiential content is objective, it has got the power of supporting beliefs about the external 
world in a rational manner. Thirdly, since sense experiences are non-doxastic mental states, 
they provide an independent basis for justifying beliefs and theories. For suppose the contrary 
were true as analytic empiricism for a long time claimed. In that case basic beliefs 
(presumably perceptual beliefs) would be our basic reasons. Perceptual beliefs are defined in 
terms of their being spontaneously and non-inferentially produced by perceptual processes. 
To a certain extent such beliefs are always dependent on our background theories. So it would 
be a mistake to call them “theory-neutral.” Let me illustrate this point by an example. Usually 
it takes only a momentary glance at the gauge to figure out how much gas is left in the tank. 
The corresponding belief occurs spontaneously and, therefore, can be correctly classified as 
an “perceptual belief.” However, this belief certainly will also depend on our knowledge 
about gauges and their capacity to indicate the quantity of gas left in the tank. Here is another 
example. Scientists “learn” to figure out how microphysical particle behave just by looking at 
their instruments. These cases illustrate the plasticity of perceptual beliefs – their sensitivity to 
our background theories.
16
 On the contrary, non-doxastic sense experiences lack this property. 
This qualifies them as the real basis for justifying our beliefs and theories about the external 
world. 
 To sum up: from a descriptive point of view sense experience appears to be a theory-
neutral and strong, though fallible basis of justification. 
 
II 
 
Now it is time to face the crucial question: what kind of feature entitles our perceptual 
representations to play the role of basic reasons for our beliefs about the material world 
                                                          
16
 Cf. Churchland 1988; Goldman 1986, p. 187, 198. 
 7 
around us – a role they indeed play? In other words: we have to ask whether the actual 
structure of justification is normatively adequate. 
 In order to answer this question, the conditions of adequacy for justification must be 
clarified by an analysis of our concept of justification. Here we have two options – 
internalism and externalism in epistemology. The epistemic internalist maintains that a belief 
is justified if and only if (i) the believer possesses reasons that make the truth of his belief at 
least probable and (ii) these reasons are cognitively accessible to him.
17
 The question is, 
whether this internalist understanding of justification is somehow compatible with the status 
of sense experiences as basic reasons. Undoubtedly, there are different internalist claims of 
explaining how sense experiences can be reasons. Firstly, there are internalists maintaining 
that perceptual representations can justify beliefs about the material world without being 
justified themselves. Secondly, there is the internalist view that intentional sense experience 
can justify beliefs only in so far as it is justified by other beliefs. Thirdly, other internalists 
admit that there are justifiers which do not require independent justification, but they restrict 
this class of cognitive states to consciousness of experience. 
 Now, what reason can an internalist give for taking sense experiences with intentional 
content as justifiers which do not require any justification themselves? Steup argues as 
follows: 
Suppose you ask me: What justifies you in believing that your coffee is sweet? This is a sensible 
question, and it has a sensible answer. The answer would be: ‘It tasts sweet.’ But now suppose we were 
to ask ‘But what justifies you in experiencing the coffee as tasting sweet, i. e., in having a sense 
experience that has as its content the proposition that the coffee is sweet?’ Well, this is not a sensible 
question. If you were to ask me that kind of question, I would have to reply that I don’t know what you 
mean. Now, what this consideration supports is this: the sort of mental states that are epistemically 
justified or unjustified are not sense experiences, but rather the doxastic attitudes we form in response to 
sense experiences. So I conclude (...) that sense experiences with propositional content do not admit of 
epistemic justification, and thus can justify without being justified themselves.
18
 
 
This argument can be construed in the following way: 
(1) Sense experiences with an intentional content are not among those things which are 
either justified or unjustified. 
(2) By virtue of their content sense experiences entertain inferential relations to beliefs 
about the external world. 
Therefore, 
(3) Sense experiences are able to justify beliefs about the external world without requiring 
justification themselves. 
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Although this argument has been proposed in one version or another by many internalists,
19
 I 
am not at all convinced by it. To begin with: premise (1) does not look very plausible. In 
defense of it, internalists argue that a cognitive state can be called either justified or 
unjustified only if it is liable to certain obligations. Experiences, however, are not liable to 
any obligations, since they are not under our voluntary control.
20
 The proponents of this 
argument take for granted that in contrast to experiences our beliefs are under voluntary 
control. They are, thereby, committed to doxastic voluntarism – a doctrine that currently has 
not many advocats, to say the least.
21
 So I do not see any reason why one should deny that 
experiences can be justified or unjustified. 
 Nevertheless, there is a certain respect in which I am inclined to agree with Steup. We 
cannot sensibly say that someone is justified or unjustified in having a certain experience. The 
reason may be this: If we are to assess persons epistemically, we should consider only those 
of their mental states which are rationally, though not voluntarily, controlled by them. Now 
beliefs obviously satisfy this condition, since they are rationally constrained by the mental life 
of the person. But the same is not true of our experiences. Now, by giving in this much I am 
only committed to withhold the talk of persons being justified or unjustified in having a 
certain experience. From this it does not at all follow that experience itself is neither justified 
nor unjustified. Hence, the internalist’s defense of premise (1) is not acceptable. 
 What is more: Even if both premises of Steup’s argument were correct, the conclusion 
would not follow. He is guilty of a simple non-sequitur! This can be easily demonstrated. 
How on earth should mental states as our sense experiences acquire any epistemic authority 
by the fact that they entail certain beliefs about the world?
22
 Any inferential justification is 
merely conditional. It transfers justification from premises to conclusion, only if the premises 
are justified themselves.
23
 So from the perspective of internalism the belief-supporting 
experience first would have to be justified as being probably correct in order to become 
capable of providing adequate reasons for our beliefs about the world. Without this further 
reasoning the position turns out to be a version of dogmatism that is incompatible with 
internalism.
24
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 The first internalist attempt to understand sense experience as basic reason of our 
beliefs about the world has been proved a failure. Thorough-going internalists must not 
consider perceptual representations as reasons which do not demand any kind of justification. 
 Let us now turn to the second internalist position. Lawrence BonJour once argued that 
sense experience can only serve as an adequate ground, if it is justified by other grounds. This 
argument against basic reasons originally goes back to some remarks of Willfried Sellars’. If 
it were sound, it would establish that internalism and foundationalism are incompatible in 
principle. BonJour attempts to establish this point by presenting the following dilemma: 
Either sense experience is intentional or it is not. If it has intentional content, it is capable of 
rendering the truth of our beliefs about the world probable, and that from the internal 
perspective of the epistemic subject. But this is not sufficient to justify these beliefs in a way 
that is acceptable for the internalist. In order to achieve this aim sense experience itself has to 
be justified as probably correct from the internal perspective. In other words: Sense 
experience cannot be a basic reason. According to the second horn, sense experience is 
analyzed as non-intentional. In this case it cannot render the truth of our beliefs probable, at 
least not from the internal perspective. It is true that it does not require any further 
justification, but at the cost of dropping out of the space of reasons. In short: Internalism does 
not allow for basic reasons.
25,
 
26
 
 But isn’t there still a possibility of reconciling internalism with foundationalism? To 
achieve that aim there would have to be mental states whose truth appears probable merely 
from within themselves – without being based on further grounds which are known to the 
subject. Something along these lines has always attracted epistemologists. Recently, even 
BonJour has become convinced that an internalist foundationalism is possible.
27
 Those mental 
states which are supposed to serve as basic reasons in the internalist sense must belong to a 
class of privileged states – the awareness of sense experience. Here there are again two 
options: On the one hand, basic reasons may be understood as beliefs, namely beliefs about 
one’s own current sense experience. On the other hand, one may think of consious 
experiences considered as non-doxastic states. 
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 Doxastic foundationalism basically creates two problems. In the first place, this 
account prevents sense experience from becoming a basic reason. It is not experience itself 
but beliefs about experience that provide a basis for justification.
28
 In the second place, it 
remains to be shown whether and how beliefs about one’s own current experience can be 
considered as basic reasons. Quite often these beliefs are said to be self-justifying. But if 
nothing more can be said, this account reduces justification to trivial circularity. Of course, 
any belief logically implies itself. But there is no way in which this fact can establish 
justification in the internalist sense. Neither is the conception of self-evidence of any help 
here. For beliefs about one’s own mental states are contingent propositions whose content 
does not support the probability of their own truth.
29
 Traditionally, foundationalists referred to 
the alleged infallibility of beliefs about one’s own mind in support of their claim that these 
beliefs do not need any independent justification. But there is every reason to be skeptical 
about this claim of infallibility. Evidence from psychology shows that there are many sources 
of error in the production of introspective beliefs, e. g. inattention, to pick just one of them.
30
 
Even more important is the fact that the actual immunity to error would not suffice for giving 
up the requirement of an independent justification of these beliefs. Nothing less than a 
necessary infallibility would do this job. However, introspective beliefs about one’s own 
experiences cannot be necessarily infallible since in their case the representing and the 
represented state are definitely distinct entities. The representing state has a doxastic nature, 
whereas the represented state is obviously of a non-doxastic character.  
 Having learnt from these problems of doxastic foundationalism BonJour favors 
conscious experiences as basic reasons.
31
 He explicitly admits that the conceptual 
apprehension of sense experiences is susceptible to error.
32
 He also may concede that one’s 
own experiences and one’s introspective beliefs about them are not identical. However, the 
relation between experiences and one’s consciousness of them is, according to him, of a 
completely different kind. In BonJour’s view the consciousness of experiences is not an 
ontologically independent representation of them but constitutive to experience.
33
 A certain 
experiential state would not be the same, if it were not conscious to the subject. This is the 
reason why consciousness of experiences is, according to him, infallible in the required sense 
whereas introspective beliefs are not. On the basis of this assumption BonJour argues that 
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conscious experiences are apt to function as basic reasons for our beliefs about them – reasons 
that do not need any justification by further reasons. 
 At first glance BonJour’s new foundationalism may look quite attractive. But it faces a 
fundamental objection.
34
 From an internalist point of view the awareness of experience is 
qualified to serve as a basic reason, only if the subject can grasp the probable truth of it 
without relying on any background information. This condition, however, is not satisfied by 
BonJour’s ontological account of experience. Granted that his account is correct, experience 
and its awareness are one and the same thing. So the awareness can never be misleading. But 
this fact is not entailed by the awareness of the experience. Hence, the subject might have 
such an awareness of his experience without being able to grasp that it is constitutive to 
experience and, for this reason, infallible. The subject will need the justified background 
assumption that the awareness is constitutive to experience in order to become entitled to use 
this awareness as a reason. This sufficiently shows that the awareness of our experiences 
cannot be a basic reason. 
 But even if it were, the aim of defending perceptual representations of the world as 
basic reasons would not be achieved. One must not miss the fundamental difference between, 
on the one hand, awarenesses of experiences which have a purely subjective content and, on 
the other hand, perceptual representations of the objective world around us. Notice also that 
BonJour’s foundationalism, if it worked, would revive the old problem from 
underdetermination,  since a subjective foundation cannot justify beliefs about the objective 
world. 
 To sum up: Internalism turns out not being able to explain how perceptual 
representations can be basic reasons for or beliefs about the world. According to it, any reason 
needs to be justified by another one.  
 This suggests that epistemic externalism might be better of. Here I will put aside the 
issue of what is the correct definition of externalism. I take it for granted that reliabilism is the 
paradigm case of externalism. Reliabilism claims that beliefs are justified, if and only if they 
are produced by reliable mechanisms, e. g. mechanisms who tend to produce more true than 
false beliefs.
35
 On this view justification exclusively depends on the reliability of the relevant 
causes. If we take a closer look, two kinds of belief-producing mechanisms must be 
distinguished.
36
 Beliefs are either justified by being product of reliable generational 
mechanisms which map non-doxastic inputs on to doxastic outputs, e. g. belief states. Or they 
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are justified by being product of transformational mechanisms which (i) map true input 
beliefs on to mostly true output beliefs, i. e. which are conditionally reliable, and (ii) are 
supplied with reliably produced input. Generational mechanism can be understood as sources 
of justification, whereas transformational mechanisms only transfer justification which is 
already established.  
 On the externalist view perception is a generational mechanism of belief-production. 
Beliefs produced by this mechanism are considered as justified since perception is reliable. 
Now where exactly does the externalist localize the perceptual reasons for our beliefs about 
the world? The most intuitive answer is this: These beliefs are justified by the reliable 
perceptual mechanism. This answer, however, cannot be the whole story. For the mechanism 
is in the end nothing more than the psychologically realized disposition to map certain inputs 
on to certain outputs. But this disposition is not the complete cause of the occurring beliefs. 
Its manifestation also depends on there being an actual input-state. From an externalist point 
of view it is most reasonable to consider this input either in isolation or in combination with 
the belief-producing mechanism as the justifying reason. Since in the case of perception the 
relevant mechanism is generational, this reason would be a basic reason – a reason which 
does not depend on other reasons as in the case of being justified by transformational 
mechanisms. So in contrast to internalism externalism leaves room for basic reasons. 
However, it seems to localize basic reasons at the wrong place! According to our ordinary 
understanding, it is perceptual representations of the world which are our basic reasons for 
perceptual beliefs. But this view is not in accordance with the externalist view. According to 
the latter, the input to our perceptual mechanisms of belief-production consists of proximal 
stimuli of the retina or other sense organs.
37
 This input has nothing in common with the 
intentional experience of the material world – the latter being at most a causal intermediary on 
the way from sensual input to perceptual belief and, hence, epistemically irrelevant.
38
 It turns 
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which are, in one way or another, accessible to us (p. 237). If this argument were sound, it would prove much 
more than Alston could appreciate. For in order to answer challenges to our claims we need not only be able to 
give reasons, but we must also defend that these reasons are adequate and serve as the actual basis of our beliefs. 
In short: Alston’s argument, if it is sound, demonstrates that an unrestricted internalism is correct. It is, however, 
not suitable to support a restricted version of internalism. I moreover believe that his argument is not sound. But 
this has to be shown on another occasion. 
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out that even externalism cannot explain why perceptual representations correctly play the 
role of basic reasons. 
 Hence, we get the following dilemma: Epistemic justification has to be analyzed in 
either internalist’s or externalist’s terms. The internalist understanding rules out basic reasons. 
Internalism is in principle incompatible with foundationalism. In contrast, the externalist 
understanding admits of basic reasons, but perceptual representations of the external world are 
not among them. So it seems as if the structure of our justification as it is ordinarily 
understood cannot be rationalized either way. We are unable to understand our actual reasons 
as good reasons. 
 
III 
 
What is the moral from all this? The internalist can hardly avoid some kind of skepticism 
since there is an unbridgeable gap between his anti-foundationalist understanding of 
justification and the actual structure of our justification. From an externalist point of view the 
upshot looks quite different. If our perceptual mechanism is indeed reliable, there is no doubt 
that beliefs produced by this mechanism are justified. But the externalist has to give up our 
folk-theory of justification. On his view the scientific investigation of our cognitive processes 
leave us with a picture that deviates radically from our ordinary conception of the structure of 
justification. According to this scientific picture, the basic reasons are proximal stimuli of the 
sense organs instead of perceptual representations which we ordinarily take to be basic. So the 
externalist will opt for a scientific revision of our ordinary understanding of the structure of 
justification. In contrast I will argue that there is no reason for becoming either a skeptic or a 
revisionist. On my view our ordinary picture of the structure of human justification can be 
defended within the framework of externalism. In order to achieve this aim we must not 
continue to think of perception as a homogeneous process. Instead we have to acknowledge 
that the process of perceptual belief-production has two distinct stages. As it will turn out this 
account is psychologically much more realistic than the single-stage view. Beforehand I will 
clarify some preliminary issues. 
 First: In the beginning I argued that the content of experience is intentional or, what is 
the same, representational, i. e. that sense experience possesses truth conditions which are, in 
so far as they are objective, localized in the external world. This is possible, even if sense 
experiences are neither doxastic nor conceptual states. Sense experience does not have 
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propositional content
39
, that is to say that the representational content is not coded in a 
linguistic manner. Propositional content is digital, i. e. highly specific, compositional, i. e. 
composed of concepts and structure, and its conceptual components are determined by their 
inferential role. All of this is not true for the coding of our sense experience’s representational 
content. Its code is analog, i. e. rich and determinate, non-compositional, and it is not 
determined by the inferential role. The upshot is this: Although the content of our beliefs, on 
the one hand, and our sense experiences, on the other hand, is certainly differently coded (or 
formated), it may perfectly correspond. The fundamental difference between beliefs and 
experiences is a matter of how something is represented (the format), but not a matter of what 
is represented (the representational content).  
 Second: The inferential relation between mental states depends exclusively on their 
content but not on the format or code of this content. Such a relation holds between two token, 
if both are causally related and their causal relation is sensitive to the logical relationship 
between the contents of these tokens. An example may illustrate this point: Suppose that a 
belief state causes another belief state such that (i) the content of the former logically implies 
the content of the latter and (ii) the caused belief state would not have the content, it actually 
has, if the causing belief state had a different content. In that case I take it that both belief 
states are inferentially related. 
 Third: a terminological point. I reserve the label “reason” for mental states which 
justify beliefs inferentially, i. e. in a deductive, inductive or abductive manner. Externalism 
does not restrict justifying facts to reasons in this sense. So reasons make up only a sub set of 
all justifying facts. Basic reasons are mental states which provide for an inferential 
justification but do not require any inferential justification themselves. Notice that this is 
compatible with the view that basic reasons need non-inferential justification and, therefore, 
are not basic justifiers. So basic reasons build the basis of all our inferential (or rational) 
justification, nothing less and nothing more. 
 Now I will turn to my own externalist solution of the above dilemma. On my view 
perceptual representations of the external world are basic inferential reasons for our beliefs 
about this world. At least in simple cases the experiences support beliefs by implying them 
deductively. This is possible since the perceptual representations of facts in the observer’s 
                                                          
39
 Sometimes the controversy about whether or not sense experience has a propositional content is merely verbal 
since the term ‘propositional’ is used ambiguously. Mostly it is used to characterize a certain format of 
representation (e. g. Dretske 1981, p. 183; Burge forthcoming), but sometimes it is also used to characterize the 
content of representation. For example Huemer 2001, p. 74, classifies the experiential content as ‘propositional’ 
since he takes it to be truth-conditional or representational. I go with the prevailing use, i. e., I will use 
‘propositional’ exclusively to characterize the format of content. 
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surrounding possess a content that is richer and more determinate than his specific beliefs 
about these facts. Although the coding of perceptual representations differs significantly from 
that of beliefs, the content of the former can entail that of the latter. However, this logical 
relation is not sufficient to account for justification. Inferential reasons have to be understood 
as inputs to transformational belief-producing mechanisms. They can justify beliefs based on 
them, only if (i) the transformational mechanism is conditionally reliable and (ii) the input to 
this mechanism is itself produced reliably. Condition (i) is satisfied by perception since, as we 
saw above, at least in the simple cases beliefs are deductively based on perceptual 
representations. Condition (ii) is satisfied since perceptual representations are produced 
reliably. We can assign a certain tracking-record (the ratio of true and false outputs) to the 
generational mechanism of producing perceptual representations, since perceptual 
representations possess truth values in virtue of their representational contents. And this 
tracking-record is in the case of perception, as far as we know, positive , i. e., the mechanism 
of producing perceptual representations is reliable. My two-stage account of the perceptual 
generation of beliefs is, therefore, suitable to explain how perceptual representations of the 
external world can be basic reasons for our beliefs about the world. These representations 
imply those beliefs deductively and they are themselves products of reliable representation-
producing mechanisms.
40
 
 So it has been demonstrated that my two-stage account of the production of perceptual 
beliefs can solve the above mentioned dilemma. It moreover has the advantage of providing 
an adequate description of the psychological reality. Cognitive psychologists nowadays 
mostly agree in distinguishing the modular mechanism of producing perceptual 
representations from the non-modular mechanism of producing perceptual beliefs.
41
 
According to them, the production of perceptual beliefs is partly determined by background 
theories and background information. What is more, these beliefs are sensitive to rational 
constraints of the overall belief system and revisable by defeaters. In contrast perceptual 
representations are produced informationally encapsulated and rigidly. So psychological 
evidence supports the view that there are two independent mechanisms which cooperate in 
producing perceptual beliefs. 
 The same is true for the view that sense experience has representational content and 
the view that there is an inferential relation between sense experience and perceptual beliefs. I 
have already presented some phenomenological evidence for the representational analysis of 
                                                          
40
 Burge forthcoming seems to hold a similar view. However, he denies that perceptual representations can figure 
in inferential justifications. According to him, experiences are only warrants but not reasons. 
41
 Cf. Marr 1982; Fodor 1983; Fodor 1984. 
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experience. I here will leave it at that. But even some of those who accept this 
representational analysis as well as the existence of a deductive relation between experience 
and perceptual beliefs do not appreciate the claim that there is an inferential relation between 
these both. Their reason is this: Inferences are understood as actions of the subject.
42
 
According to the standard account of action explanation, actions are the causal results of 
beliefs and desires. Therefore, they are thought to be under voluntary control. Exactly this, 
however, is not true for the production of perceptual beliefs which can be said to occur 
spontaneously. In case I see a car running down the street, I cannot avoid believing that a car 
is running down the street, no matter how much this is what I wish. Since, so the argument 
runs, perceptual beliefs are not under voluntary control, they cannot be understood as results 
of inferential actions. 
 Now I do not find any psychological plausibility in the view that inferences are a kind 
of action.
43
 It seems clear to me that beliefs are hardly ever caused or controlled by desires. 
As soon as we grasp that a claim follows from what we believe, we cannot any longer avoid 
accepting it. This is certainly not a matter of decision. We may better describe the situation as 
that of rational force. For this reason I cannot agree with the opponents to an inferential view 
of perceptual beliefs. It is true, we do not have voluntary control over these states, but we do 
not have voluntary control over any other beliefs either. 
 
Finally, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to some interesting consequences of my 
two-stage account of perceptual beliefs. If this account is correct, the basic reasons for our 
theories about the world are non-conceptual sense experiences. This guarantees that there is a 
theory-independent basis for the justification of our theories. We can call this basis “theory-
independent” for two reasons. First, in contrast to beliefs it does not consist of conceptual 
constituents. Concepts, however, are always (at least partly) determined by their inferential 
roles within our theories of the world. Second, processes which result in non-conceptual 
perceptual representations are not sensitive to background theories. Cognitive scientists are 
used to call basic perceptual processes “cognitively impenetrable”.44 This view is supported 
by the familiar fact that sensory illusions are resistant to recalcitrant knowledge. For example, 
the Müller-Lyer illusion does not vanish when I have learned that both of its lines are equally 
long. Although basic perceptual processes often look “intelligent,” they cannot be understood 
as rational inferences controlled by the content of the involved states. They should better be 
                                                          
42
 See Peacocke 1999, p. 20; Burge forthcoming. 
43
 See also Alston 1989b. 
44
 Fodor 1984. 
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seen as transformational processes which are acquired (by evolution or learning history) 
because of their reliability within the actual environment. In contrast perceptual beliefs are 
cognitively penetrable and hence theory-dependent.
45
 Now, there is an obvious advantage of a 
theory-neutral basis of justification. Such a basis, if it is reliable, is reliable in general, no 
matter what the cultural or theoretical context is like. So we have got an independent and non-
relativistic standard for assessing theories, cultures and traditions. In short: Experience is the 
basic standard of our epistemic evaluation of theories. 
 By the two-stage account of perceptual beliefs we are, moreover, committed to the 
view that mental states underneath the level of beliefs can and even must have epistemic 
properties. Perceptual representations, in so far as they are reliably produced, should be taken 
as justified. If they happen to be true, one even might see them as instances of knowledge. 
This clearly runs counter to our ordinary discourse in which we attribute “justification” only 
to beliefs. But this need not be a decisive counterargument. Admittedly, some of the 
characteristic features of human justification are indeed restricted to beliefs. It is only beliefs 
whose justification can be defeated and rationally revised, whereas sense experiences are 
relatively inflexible. Moreover, nothing but beliefs can be justified inferentially, whereas 
perceptual representations are never inferentially produced, though they may serve us as 
inferential reasons. These differences may explain why we usually do not say that experiences 
are justified. However, I do not see any reason to deny their being justified (at least in an 
elementary sense), if perceptual representations are reliably produced. Perhaps one should 
even speak of “proto-knowledge”, in case these states happen to be true (in the right, non-
Gettier-type of way). This would have the advantage of making possible the attribution of 
justification and knowledge to animals and small children who are not equipped with beliefs. 
 My account of empirical justification is, of course, foundationalist. But it significantly 
differs from classic accounts of foundationalism in so far as it takes basic reasons not to be 
infallible or incorrigible, as the latter would have it. Foundationalism, according to me, 
provides us with basic but not ultimate reasons. 
 Last, but not least basic experiential reasons are, according to my account, directed at 
the external world without any intermediary. Therefore, the empirical foundation has the 
capacity of carrying our knowledge about the world. On this basis we also can overcome the 
old threat to empiricism, namely the problem from underdetermination of knowledge by 
evidence. So we might trust empiricism after all.
46
 
                                                          
45
 Goldman 1986, p. 198. 
46
 For a comprehensive defense of epistemic externalism on the basis of conceptual analysis see Grundmann 
2002 and Grundmann 2003. 
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 My conclusion is this: Our intuitive, pre-theoretical, one even might say naive picture 
of our beliefs’ being justified by sense experience not only can be defended from the 
perspective of externalism, it also turns out to be a quite attractive position in so far as 
epistemological questions are concerned. 
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